Media Accuracy

These cases document where established outlets — outlets with a masthead and editorial accountability — reported something that an independent assessor (court, press council, fact-checker, or peer-reviewed study) found to be inaccurate, misleading, or, in some instances, demonstrably correct after a challenge. Redress mechanisms exist for this category: corrections, Press Council complaints, court action. Aggregates below are scoped to this section only.

Evidence tier:
MTVA Fidesz opinion Tier C correction issued
“M1 goes dark: 'A közmédia nem hazudhat. Bocsánatot kérünk...' (self-acknowledged years of false reporting)”

This is an institutional self-admission rather than a third-party finding. On 2026-07-07, following the change of government after TISZA's election victory, MTVA's new interim leadership suspended news programming on M1 and published a formal apology on M1 and hirado.hu: 'Public media must not lie. We apologize for having done so for many years.' The statement acknowledged political distortion, silencing of opposition voices, and incorporation of Russian war propaganda. Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely had documented these patterns quantitatively (Mérték Füzetek 34, 40, 42) and Political Capital / Lakmusz published detailed evidence of specific fabrications. Tone is 'negative' toward Fidesz: the event does not favour Fidesz — it was the previous Fidesz government that used the public broadcaster for state propaganda, and the admission publicly attributes years of false reporting to that arrangement. Broadcasting remains suspended until the new independent broadcast council is constituted.

MTVA Fidesz misleading Tier B
“Orbán: 'Magyarország Európa legbiztonságosabb országa' + inflációs és bérnövekedési csúsztatások”

A recurring claim made by Viktor Orbán throughout 2024-2026 — that Hungary is 'Europe's safest country' — was fact-checked by Lakmusz. Examining Eurostat data across 25 crime categories, Lakmusz found Hungary ranked first in only one. In murder rates, five EU countries had better figures; in child sexual exploitation nine were better; drug abuse ranked tenth; theft eleventh. Orbán consistently provided no data source. The same outgoing-government 'inventory' speech also contained misleading economic claims fact-checked by Lakmusz: wage-growth statistics used only nominal figures, omitting Hungary's cumulative 94% inflation since 2010 — the highest in the EU and nearly double the EU average; and a claim of '200,000 fewer children in poverty' was not supported by KSH data. MTVA/M1 amplified these claims uncritically. No correction was issued.

Magyar Nemzet TISZA incorrect Tier B
“Menczer: Weber lebuktatta – Magyar Péterrel együtt a frontvonalban harcolnak Ukrajnáért”

Fidesz Communications Director Menczer Tamás posted a manipulatively edited clip on 2026-03-19 purporting to show EPP President Manfred Weber admitting that he and Magyar Péter were fighting together on the frontline for Ukraine. Lakmusz fact-checked the claim on 2026-03-24 by locating Weber's full seven-minute press conference on the DRM News YouTube channel. In the original, Weber mentioned Ukraine and Magyar Péter in entirely separate contexts: Magyar Péter was cited only as an example of EPP partners fighting right-wing populism in Europe, not as a Ukraine war ally. The clip was deceptively spliced. Despite Lakmusz's debunk, seven major government-aligned outlets (Mandiner, Ripost, TV2 Tények, HírTV, Magyar Nemzet, Pesti Srácok, Demokrata, Bors) published the false framing without correction. Kubatov Gábor further remixed the clip with Magyar's own speech to create a second-order false composite.

MTVA TISZA misleading Tier B
“Szijjártó: a NATO katonákkal, hadihajókkal és vadászgépekkel avatkozna be Ukrajna oldalán”

During the 2026 election campaign Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó repeatedly claimed that NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte had stated NATO would intervene with troops, warships, and fighter jets on Ukraine's side — presenting this as proof of a 'pro-war' stance shared by TISZA. Lakmusz's campaign monitoring documented this as a manipulatively spliced and decontextualised misrepresentation of Rutte's actual statements about European defence capacity. Separately, Szijjártó claimed 1.4 million Ukrainian refugees had entered Hungary; Lakmusz found only 42,010 persons had official temporary protection status per Eurostat November 2025 data. Both false framings were central to the Fidesz 'béke vs. háború' campaign and were amplified across government media without any subsequent correction.

MTVA TISZA incorrect Tier B
“Az ukrán sajtóban már Orbán Viktor meggyilkolása a téma — valójában egyetlen névtelen poszt volt”

During the 2026 election campaign Orbán Viktor and Menczer Tamás spread the claim that 'Ukrainian media' was openly discussing the assassination of Viktor Orbán, using it to frame TISZA as allied with a foreign power threatening the prime minister's life. Lakmusz's monitoring found the entire claim rested on a single anonymous Facebook post on a minor Ukrainian page. Contacted by Lakmusz, the page administrator confirmed the post was discussing a hypothetical scenario (what would happen if the PM were no longer in power) — not any actual assassination plan. The false claim was nonetheless amplified across all government-aligned media channels. No correction was issued. The EDMO/Political Capital/Lakmusz 2026 election monitoring report also documented this episode as part of the anti-TISZA disinformation ecosystem.

Magyar Nemzet TISZA misleading Tier B
“A Zelenszkij-terv: Brüsszel és Kijev ki akarja szavazni Orbán Viktort”

From 2026-02-11 Orbán Viktor publicly described a POLITICO article ('5 steps to get Ukraine into the EU by 2027') as the 'Zelenszkij-terv' — a secret EU-Kyiv scheme to overthrow him and install TISZA leader Magyar Péter. Lakmusz fact-checked this on 2026-02-12, identifying five false claims: the POLITICO text was background journalism based on 10 anonymous sources, not a formal plan; it nowhere stated the EU intended to remove Orbán; Zelensky did not author it; it made no statement about electoral intervention in Hungary; and Magyar Péter was mentioned only incidentally as someone EU officials hoped might change Ukraine policy. Pro-government media (Index, Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner, Ripost, Vadhajtások) amplified Orbán's false framing without correction, and the 'Zelenszkij-terv' became a central Fidesz 2026 campaign narrative. No correction was issued by any government-aligned outlet.

Origo TISZA incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Tisza-adóterv hálózat: 12 kiegészítő helyreigazítás (2025–2026 ügycsoport)”

Beyond the Index-as-lead-case already in corpus (hu-mr-007), TISZA filed 13 press correction lawsuits over the AI-generated fake economic programme published in August 2025. Lakmusz's litigation tracker (27 March 2026) reported the status of all 13: by that date, several Mediaworks network outlets (Magyar Szó, Haon.hu, Ripost) had either published court-ordered corrections or had first-instance rulings pending against them. Index's own correction became enforceable on 8 May 2026. The Fővárosi Törvényszék found in each adjudicated case that the outlets had reported a forged document as TISZA's authentic economic plan without verification, and that CopyLeaks analysis of the document (finding near-50% AI-generated content and citations to non-existent academic papers) had been publicly available. Magyar Péter stated on 3 May 2026 that he expected the correction to appear on Index's homepage, not buried — documenting continued non-compliance. This entry covers the broader network beyond the lead Index case.

MTVA TISZA misleading Tier B
“M1 election coverage: TISZA excluded or negatively framed throughout 2025-2026 campaign (Mérték monitoring)”

Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely's monitoring of M1's 19:30 evening news during the 2025-2026 period found that Viktor Orbán's coverage score was +0.95 on a -1 to +1 scale — near-total absence of critical commentary — while TISZA and Magyar Péter received systematically negative or zero coverage. The Republikon Institute's 2025 annual public media monitoring confirmed M1 devoted the overwhelming majority of political coverage to Fidesz in a positive light. MTVA received approximately 80 billion HUF in public funding in the first six months of 2025 alone (0.19% of GDP), per State Media Monitor data, while functioning as a partisan government mouthpiece. The OSCE/ODIHR preliminary statement on the April 2026 elections found MTVA coverage 'openly and disproportionately' supported the ruling parties, with opposition politicians given 'almost no opportunity to speak'. MTVA's own management acknowledged systematic lying on 2026-07-07 (see hu-mr-012).

MTVA TISZA incorrect Tier B
“AI-videó: Kapitány István 'elismeri', hogy a Tisza csak a győzelem UTÁN közli a terveit”

Fidesz MEP Balázs Hidvéghi created an AI-generated video of TISZA economist and minister-candidate István Kapitány in which Kapitány appears to say that the Tisza party would reveal its programme only after winning — a statement he never made. The actual summer-interview quote was a pro-transparency remark about communicating goals and achieving them. Separately, M1 Híradó featured a non-AI but manipulatively cut Kapitány quote in which he appeared to advocate that Hungarian consumers pay for the energy transition — in reality the clip was from a different interview in which he was discussing British EV charging infrastructure, not Hungarian utility prices. Multiple pro-government influencers using this cut ran it as paid Facebook ads. Lakmusz documented both manipulations in its 2026 election monitoring. No correction was issued by Hidvéghi, M1, or any pro-government outlet.

TV2 TISZA incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Kitálalt egy volt családtag: lopással, zsarolással vádolja Magyar Péter apját”

TV2 Tények broadcast in its flagship evening news on 2025-08-31 that Magyar Péter's father (dr. Magyar István) and uncle (Magyar József) had stolen, defrauded, embezzled and forged public documents, and had misappropriated 80 million forints invested by Miklós Molnár in a joint pálinka company. All claims were false. A court ordered TV2 to broadcast a correction; anchor Varga Attila — himself a public Fidesz supporter — read the correction live on 2026-06-10: 'We falsely reported that dr. Magyar István...stole, defrauded, embezzled and forged public documents.' The original 2025-08-31 broadcast remained accessible on TV2's platform after the correction, which Media1 and Contextus.hu documented as a further compliance failure. The correction was described as a major legal milestone by Hungarian press-law observers.

Index TISZA incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Az Index megszerezte a Tisza Párt titkos gazdasági tervét”

Index published what it presented as an internal TISZA economic planning document showing that the party intended drastic personal income tax increases. The Tisza Party denied authorship from the outset, calling the documents AI-generated forgeries. Analysis by researcher Rácz András (using CopyLeaks) found nearly half the content was AI-generated; the document contained false statistical figures (e.g. a 2024 birth rate of 88,000 vs the real 77,500) and cited non-existent academic sources. Twelve other pro-government outlets (Origo, Ripost, Magyar Nemzet, Haon.hu, hirado.hu, Mandiner and others) republished the claims. TISZA filed 13 press-correction lawsuits. After a missed appeal deadline the Fővárosi Törvényszék ruling became final, and Index was compelled on 2026-05-08 to publish a correction stating it 'falsely claimed that the document was the TISZA Party's official economic plan prepared by its economic cabinet.'

Origo TISZA incorrect Tier B correction issued
“Origo: TISZA titkos adócsomag (a 13 sajtóper egyike – Origo-specifikus ítélet)”

Origo was among the Mediaworks network outlets ordered by the Fővárosi Törvényszék to publish a correction for republishing the AI-generated fake TISZA economic programme as an authentic document (see also hu-mr-007 Index lead case and hu-mr-019 Mediaworks network case). The Lakmusz litigation tracker (27.03.2026) reported Origo's first-instance ruling had been issued and correction was pending enforcement. Courts found Origo had repeated the forged document's claims without any verification steps despite publicly available evidence of forgery: CopyLeaks analysis showing approximately 50% AI-generated content, false statistical figures (birth rate of 88,000 vs actual 77,500), and citations to non-existent academic papers. Origo had already lost 13 press-correction lawsuits in 2024 — joint second highest in government media per Atlatszo.hu FOI — and the TISZA-tax case was among its most consequential. This entry covers Origo's specific ruling distinct from the Index lead case.

Magyar Nemzet TISZA incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Magyar Péter ábrázolása poloskakárokként (dehumanizáló képkampány)”

Magyar Nemzet and related Mediaworks outlets (including Haon.hu and Haol.hu) published a series of articles in March 2025 depicting TISZA leader Péter Magyar as a cockroach ('poloska') using memes, montages, and caricatures — including an image of an insect with Magyar's face, a boot trampling a bug, and a can of national-colour pesticide. Magyar filed a personality rights (személyiségi jogi per) lawsuit. The Fővárosi Törvényszék ruled in Magyar's favour, finding the dehumanising imagery violated his dignity and personality rights, and enjoined Mediaworks from further such publications. Mediaworks was required to send Magyar a written apology letter; Magyar Nemzet's post-election editorial management did so on 27 April 2026, opening 'Tisztelt Magyar Péter Úr!' The ruling was reported by Népszava (27.04.2026) and HVG, and the Atlatszo.hu 2024 FOI data confirmed Magyar Nemzet led government media with 24 press-correction losses that year.

TV2 TISZA incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Tények segment: 'Nem voltak bírók a bírótüntetésen' / 'A Soros-hálózat finanszírozta'”

TV2 Tények broadcast that no judges attended the judges' protest demonstration (bírótüntetés) and that the Soros network financed the event. Both claims were false: the Hungarian Judges Association (Magyar Bírói Egyesület) provided evidence that judges were present not only as attendees but as speakers. The Budapest Metropolitan Court of Appeal (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla) issued a binding final judgment on 2025-08-07 ordering TV2 to publish a correction and pay court costs. The protest was closely associated with defence of judicial independence at a time when the government was at odds with independent judges; the demonstration drew broad support from TISZA.

Ripost TISZA incorrect Tier B
“AI-generált Magyar Péter-videó: Tisza állítólagos nyugdíjpolitika-kijelentése”

In October 2024, Fidesz campaign director Balázs Orbán posted an AI-generated video on social media depicting TISZA leader Péter Magyar making statements about pension policy that he never said. Ripost embedded and amplified the video as authentic content. Lakmusz and Political Capital documented this case in their EDMO joint report (August 2024 and updated 2026) as part of the Megafon influencer network's €1.3 million hostile-narrative ad campaign. The EDMO study identified 511 paid ads containing at least one false or misleading claim (total spend: €475,000), of which this AI video was among the most-shared individual items. No correction was issued by Ripost; the video remained on Balázs Orbán's official social media. This is the first documented case in Hungary of a senior government official posting an AI-fabricated video of an opposition leader as a political campaign tool.

Mandiner TISZA incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Mandiner: Ötkert-ügyhöz kapcsolódó valótlan állítások (nyolcadik per az Ötkert-klaszterben)”

Mandiner was the eighth outlet to lose a press-correction lawsuit to Magyar Péter over the Ötkert nightclub false-claim cluster. Magyar announced the ruling on Facebook stating it was 'the eighth winning case from just the Ötkert fairytale afternoon' and that he had by then exceeded 30 total won cases against government media. The consecutive Ötkert cluster wins against eight different outlets — all originating from the original Ripost article of 2024-07-07 — were reported by HVG on 2024-09-09 as a landmark series. Mandiner, while presenting as a conservative opinion magazine rather than a tabloid, republished the Ripost false allegations without independent verification. Atlatszo.hu's 2025 FOI data (published 13.03.2025) confirmed Magyar Nemzet (24 losses), Origo (13), and Ripost (13) leading government media in 2024 press-correction losses, with Mandiner's individual case forming part of the documented cluster.

HírTV TISZA incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Paláver – 'örülj, ha szétteheted nekem a lábat' — mondta Magyar Péter egy kiskorú lánynak+videó”

HírTV published two articles on 2024-07-07, based on a Ripost story, alleging that TISZA founder Péter Magyar had made obscene and perverse proposals to minors at the Ötkert nightclub in Budapest, told a minor girl a lewd phrase, threatened a girl's father with his bodyguards, and threatened to close the venue using his connections. Magyar denied every element and filed press-correction lawsuits. On 2025-04-02 HírTV published two court-ordered corrections (helyreigazítások) admitting it 'falsely reported that Magyar Péter made obscene proposals to minors' and retracted all related allegations. Magyar stated that not a single word in the original articles was true. HírTV was among the nine Mediaworks outlets forced to retract Ötkert claims, and Magyar logged at least eight successful press-correction judgments in the cluster.

Mediaworks county network TISZA incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Magyar Péter perverz beszólásokkal alázta a tinilányokat (county-paper cluster)”

Multiple Mediaworks county newspapers (including Zaol.hu, Sonline.hu, Bama.hu, Haon.hu) simultaneously republished a Ripost article against Magyar Péter, alleging he had sexually harassed minors, threatened a father, and threatened to close a venue. The Zalaegerszegi Törvényszék ruled against Zaol.hu/Mediaworks in a judgment on 2024-08-30, ordering a correction and payment of approximately 925,000 HUF (2,320 EUR) to Magyar plus 37,900 HUF court costs, and required the correction to appear at the top of the original article for at least 30 days. HVG reported on 2024-09-09 that Magyar had by that point won eight consecutive press-correction cases in the Ötkert cluster — all against Mediaworks properties — with every outlet forced to publish corrections admitting the Ripost story was entirely false.

Magyar Nemzet TISZA incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Magyar Péter poloskázás — bocsánatkérés (series 2024–2026)”

Magyar Nemzet published a series of articles in 2024 alleging that TISZA founder Péter Magyar had planted listening devices ('poloskák') in family members' homes. Magyar won a personality rights lawsuit over these claims. After the TISZA election victory in 2026, Magyar Nemzet's new editorial management sent Magyar a formal written apology in April 2026, acknowledging the articles had falsely attributed criminal conduct to him without evidentiary basis. Népszava and Nepszava.hu reported the letter on 27 April 2026. This is one of the cases captured in Atlatszo.hu's 2024 FOI data showing that Magyar Nemzet, Origo, and Ripost together lost the most press correction lawsuits that year (Magyar Nemzet led with 10 losses from 14 cases). The pattern of 'bug-planting' allegations against opposition leaders was a recurring false-claim template documented across multiple outlets.

Pesti Srácok TISZA incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Transznemű influenszer állítja: kiskorú fiúval létesíthetett homoszexuális kapcsolatot Osváth Zsolt”

Pesti Srácok published an article alleging that popular YouTuber Osváth Zsolt, a prominent TISZA-aligned civil figure who organised a 100,000-person protest over the presidential pardon scandal in February 2024, had sexual relations with a 16-year-old boy when he was 30. The allegation was sourced from a TikTok influencer and had no evidentiary basis. Nine days later, on 2024-03-12, Pesti Srácok published a court-ordered correction admitting it 'had falsely spread the rumour.' Origo published an identical correction the same day for its own version of the article. Osváth later said any weaker person targeted by such a campaign might have been destroyed by it.

Pesti Srácok Magyar Szocialista Part - Parbeszed Magyarorszagert Part incorrect Tier B
“Erőszakkal soroztak be magyar fiatalokat az ukrán hadseregbe Kárpátalján”

Pesti Srácok published a claim in January 2023 that Ukrainian soldiers and police were conducting mass forced conscription of ethnic Hungarian youths in Transcarpathia. The claim used the novel term 'kényszersorozás' (forced conscription) without documentary evidence. It was immediately amplified by Magyar Nemzet, Origo, M1, and by Russian state media including TASS and RT, which adopted the terminology verbatim. Lakmusz's November 2023 investigation into the Russian disinformation ecosystem in Hungary identified this cluster as a prime example of a Hungarian outlet (Pesti Srácok) originating a claim that entered the Russian state-media narrative loop. Visegrad Insight researcher Dorka Takácsy characterised the story as disinformation. The Ukrainian Armed Forces denied the specific claims. No correction was published; the story continued to circulate in government-media channels into 2024. Classified under MSZP-Párbeszéd because the anti-Ukrainian narrative was simultaneously used to attack the Hungarian socialist and liberal opposition for their support of EU/NATO positions.

Magyar Nemzet Lehet Mas a Politika - Magyarorszag Zold Partja incorrect Tier A correction issued
“CÖF-CÖKA sajtótájékoztató: Átlátszó 'nemzetbiztonsági kockázat' (valótlan állítások)”

The pro-government civil organisation CÖF-CÖKA held a press conference in early January 2023 making several false factual claims about the financing and activities of Atlatszo.hu (Átlátszó), Hungary's leading investigative outlet. Magyar Nemzet and MTI reported these claims as fact without contacting Átlátszó or giving the organisation an opportunity to respond. Atlatszo.hu filed press correction lawsuits against both outlets. The Fővárosi Törvényszék issued a first-instance ruling in March 2023 in favour of Átlátszó: the false facts could not be substantiated, and neither outlet had applied basic verification. Magyar Nemzet published the court-ordered correction at the end of 2023. MTI's correction was separately enforced. Atlatszo.hu won all cases brought against it in 2023. Classified under LMP because Átlátszó's investigative journalism on government procurement and environmental issues overlaps significantly with the LMP platform and the outlet is routinely attacked via the 'Soros-funded' opposition-media framing that directly impacts LMP's credibility.

MTI TISZA incorrect Tier A correction issued
“MTI helyreigazítás: MTI valótlanul állított tényeket az Átlátszó finanszírozásáról (CÖF-CÖKA állítás-átvétel)”

MTI (Hungarian News Agency) republished unverified claims made at a CÖF-CÖKA press conference about Atlatszo.hu's foreign funding and alleged political bias, presenting them as established facts without contacting Atlatszo.hu for a response or verification. The Fővárosi Törvényszék first-instance ruling (March 2023) found MTI had printed factually false claims without basic verification steps. MTI published a court-ordered correction; Magyar Nemzet published its own separate correction of the same CÖF-CÖKA false claims on Christmas Eve 2023, a date chosen to minimise public attention. Media1 reported MTI's correction on 17 January 2024. The case is significant because MTI is Hungary's official state news agency: its republication of unverified political attack narratives propagates them automatically into thousands of downstream publications, most of which carried no correction. Atlatszo.hu's coverage of government corruption and procurement — the subject of the attacks — overlaps with opposition platforms, including TISZA.

Magyar Hírlap Lehet Mas a Politika - Magyarorszag Zold Partja misleading Tier B
“Magyar Hírlap cites Orosz Hírek 1,500+ times: disinformation laundering via LMP-adjacent environmental framing”

Lakmusz's November 2023 investigation into Orosz Hírek (a Kremlin-aligned Hungarian-language website) found that Magyar Hírlap, a mainstream pro-government daily, cited Orosz Hírek content more than 1,500 times in 2023 alone, legitimising Russian disinformation narratives within Hungarian mainstream media. Among the narratives repeatedly laundered through this channel were anti-environmental regulatory stories (EU 'green bureaucracy destroys Hungarian agriculture') and anti-EU energy policy stories — both targeting LMP's pro-EU, pro-green policy positions by portraying the EU environmental agenda as harmful to Hungary. No helyreigazítás was issued; the 1,500+ citations were not editorial errors but a documented editorial pattern. Classified under LMP because the systematic discrediting of EU environmental policy — LMP's core platform — via false or misleading Russian-originated narratives constitutes a sustained negative coverage pattern against LMP's political programme.

Magyar Nemzet Jobbik incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Kiadja a Jobbik Jakab Péter útját”

Magyar Nemzet published an article claiming that Jobbik vice-chair Potocskáné Kőrösi Anita had stated Jakab Péter would 'kétszáz százalék' (200%) found a new party — a quote she never gave. The Budapest Metropolitan Court found this a false statement of fact and ordered Magyar Nemzet to publish a helyreigazítás. The correction, published on the Magyar Nemzet website in December 2022, admitted: 'Valótlanul állítottuk, hogy Potocskáné Kőrösi Anita azt mondta, Jakab saját pártot alapít.' This is one of at least three Jobbik-related cases in Magyar Nemzet's 2022–2023 cluster of seven lost press correction lawsuits (the most of any outlet that year, per Atlatszo.hu FOI). A second ruling in the same year (September 2022 article 'Elnökei után fut a Jobbik?') also resulted in a forced correction for misrepresenting Potocskáné's legal standing as party chair.

Magyar Nemzet Jobbik incorrect Tier A correction issued
“90 kamuszervezet + Jakab elnökválasztás meghackelése (series 2022)”

Magyar Nemzet published claims in mid-2022 that (1) Jobbik had created 90 fake local chapters ('kamuszervezetek') before the May 2022 congress, and (2) that Szabó Gábor had rigged the congress timetable so that Jakab Péter could win. The Fővárosi Törvényszék ruled both claims false and ordered helyreigazítás. Separately, a Székesfehérvári Törvényszék ruled on a related claim about Jakab being ordered to reveal a state secret, also finding Magyar Nemzet in the wrong. As documented by Jobbik's published press-litigation list (jobbik.hu/sajtoperek) and by the Atlatszo.hu 2021 FOI data (Magyar Nemzet was rekorder with 20 lost cases in 2021), Jobbik's politicians were the most frequent individual plaintiffs in Magyar Nemzet press correction cases during 2020–2022. The cluster of false claims targeted Jobbik at the moment it was being absorbed into the broader opposition coalition and at its most politically vulnerable.

MTVA TISZA misleading Tier B
“A bal még mindig háborút akar (Márki-Zay quotes looped 10 times over 14 days)”

During the 2022 election campaign, M1's flagship Híradó repeatedly broadcast under the headline 'A bal még mindig háborút akar' ('The left still wants war') an 18-day-old soundbite from united opposition candidate Péter Márki-Zay in which he discussed ammunition — airing this clip approximately 10 times over 14 days and framing it as current news. The full context showed Márki-Zay speaking hypothetically; the selective loop created the false impression that the opposition was actively advocating sending Hungarian soldiers to Ukraine. Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely's 2022 election monitoring (Mérték Füzetek 34, 'Befagyott médiarendszer — Lágy Cenzúra 2022') documented this as a systemic pattern: opposition voices were excluded almost entirely from M1, with Márki-Zay receiving only five minutes of live airtime on the state broadcaster in four years. The OSCE/ODIHR final report on the April 2022 election concluded that 'coverage on M1, the public broadcaster, showed bias in favour of the ruling coalition, contrary to international standards.'

MTVA Momentum Mozgalom misleading Tier B
“M1 Híradó: Momentum kizárva az egyensúlyos kampánybemutatásból (2022 választási kampány)”

OSCE/ODIHR's Final Report on the April 2022 Hungarian parliamentary elections documented that M1 coverage was 'overwhelmingly favourable to the ruling coalition' and that opposition parties — including Momentum as part of the joint opposition list — were almost entirely absent from neutral news coverage, while coverage of opposition leaders when it did appear was systematically negative. Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely's Mérték Füzetek 34 (Befagyott Médiarendszer, 2022) specifically documented that Momentum and its then-leader Fekete-Győr András received no substantive policy coverage on M1 during the campaign, compared to daily positive Fidesz–KDNP coverage. Fekete-Győr himself noted that in four years the combined pro-government propaganda media had lost 297 press correction lawsuits — the systematic exclusion of Momentum from balanced coverage was part of the same documented bias. MTVA's July 2026 self-admission of systematic false reporting corroborates the pattern.

Origo Demokratikus Koalicio incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Gyurcsány titkos egyeztetése a szfe-s tüntetők mögött”

Origo alleged that Ferenc Gyurcsány (DK president) orchestrated the protests at the University of Theatre and Film Arts (SZFE) through secret negotiations with Karácsony Gergely and Alföldi Róbert. The Budapest Metropolitan Court (Fővárosi Törvényszék) ruled that the alleged secret meeting never took place and ordered Origo to publish a correction. The court-ordered correction stated that Origo 'did not tell the truth about Ferenc Gyurcsány.' Instead of a proper correction Origo appended only a note saying Alföldi denied the meeting, prompting further enforcement proceedings.

Pesti Srácok Demokratikus Koalicio incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Gréczy Zsolt: DK-s politician defamation articles (series)”

Pesti Srácok published a series of defamatory articles targeting DK spokesperson Zsolt Gréczy. Gréczy won a final, binding court judgment against Pesti Srácok on 2020-07-29. Pesti Srácok then failed to pay the court-ordered damages on time, forcing Gréczy to initiate enforcement proceedings on 2021-06-06; a court enforcement officer ultimately collected the money on 2021-08-04. Pesti Srácok lost 15 press-correction lawsuits in 2020 alone — second only to Origo — per Atlatszo.hu FOI data from the Fővárosi Törvényszék.

MTVA Demokratikus Koalicio misleading Tier B
“M1 coverage: DK and Gyurcsány excluded from state broadcaster airtime (Mérték monitoring 2019)”

Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely's 2019 election monitoring (documented in Mérték Füzetek and summarised in the 2022 Befagyott Médiarendszer report) found that DK and party leader Ferenc Gyurcsány received near-zero live airtime on M1's flagship news programmes during election periods, while receiving systematically negative framing whenever mentioned. The OSCE/ODIHR mission for the May 2019 European Parliament election (as well as the April 2022 national election report) concluded that 'M1 heavily favoured the ruling coalition and did not provide balanced coverage of opposition parties', specifically citing DK's absence from neutral news coverage. The MTVA's own institutional admission on 7 July 2026 — that state media had 'hazudott' (lied) for years — implicitly corroborates this documented pattern for DK as one of the principal opposition parties affected.

Origo Jobbik incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Bármi történik a Jobbik kongresszusán, nyakukon a pártszakadás”

Origo falsely claimed that oligarch Lajos Simicska had asked Jobbik leader Gábor Vona to return an Audi worth 20 million forints. In reality, Vona had never received any car from Simicska, so no return request could have been made. This was among a cluster of false Origo articles about Jobbik's 2018 congress — the alfahir.hu outlet documented the Fővárosi Törvényszék finding that Origo's article 'was false from the first sentence to the last.' The court ordered a correction. Origo lost 109 press-correction lawsuits in 2018 alone, the most of any outlet that year, per Atlatszo.hu FOI data from the Budapest Metropolitan Court.

Figyelő Magyar Szocialista Part - Parbeszed Magyarorszagert Part incorrect Tier A correction issued
“A spekuláns emberei (Soros-lista)”

Figyelő published a list of named individuals — civil society workers, academics, lawyers, journalists — labelling them 'György Soros's mercenaries' during the 2018 election campaign. Among those listed were MSZP-linked civil society figures and individuals associated with left-liberal political networks. The Budapest Metropolitan Court (Fővárosi Törvényszék) issued a first-instance ruling on 28 September 2022 (upheld in subsequent proceedings) finding the list false, unnecessary, and fear-inducing: there was no factual basis for claiming the named individuals were 'mercenaries of a foreign speculative power', and the list was indiscriminate (including deceased persons). The court ordered Figyelő/Mediaworks to apologise and pay 200,000–500,000 HUF sérelemdíj per plaintiff (34 plaintiffs in the collective action, assisted by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee). Figyelő published the court-ordered apology on figyelo.hu on or around 11 February 2023, front-page for 24 hours.

Origo Magyar Szocialista Part - Parbeszed Magyarorszagert Part incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Czeglédy Csaba a Jobbikot is pénzelte”

Origo published a false claim on 30 March 2018 that MSZP-linked attorney and politician Csaba Czeglédy had previously financed Jobbik. The Fővárosi Törvényszék found the claim false and ordered a helyreigazítás. This case is part of Atlatszo.hu's documented FOI finding that Origo lost 44 of 109 press correction cases in 2018 alone — the most of any outlet in a single year in Hungary — nearly all targeting opposition politicians in the pre-election period. The Czeglédy case is explicitly named in the atlatszo.hu 2022 aggregate report as one of the documented individual false-claim rulings against Origo from that year.

Origo Jobbik incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Vona házhoz megy a székely pofonért Marosvásárhelyen”

Origo falsely claimed in its March 2018 article that Jobbik chairman Gábor Vona 'felesküdött Allahra' (swore an oath to Allah), part of a campaign to discredit Jobbik as Islamist-linked ahead of the 2018 election. The Budapest Metropolitan Court ruled this factually false. Origo published the court-ordered helyreigazítás on 2020-12-19 — over two and a half years later — admitting the claim was untrue. A separate, related false claim that Vona was a member of the Islamist 'Grey Wolves' organisation (also published by Origo and repeated by KDNP MP Miklós Soltész) was also adjudicated and lost by the outlets concerned, per Jobbik's published press-litigation records.

Ripost Lehet Mas a Politika - Magyarorszag Zold Partja incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Hadházy Ákos és szülei: elzárt víz + törvénytelen földügylet (series)”

Ripost published in January 2017 that LMP MP Hadházy Ákos and his parents had cut off a neighbour's water supply; separately Ripost and Origo claimed the family participated in illegal land dealings as straw men. All claims were false. The courts adjudicated two separate cases: the Fővárosi Törvényszék awarded Hadházy and his parents 1.8 million HUF in damages in December 2020 for the land-dealing false claims, and separately ordered Ripost to publish a helyreigazítás on the water case — which Ripost complied with only in September 2021, four years and eight months after publication, and in a form that omitted the section relating to Hadházy's father. Hadházy (then LMP, later independent) described the deliberate delay and partial compliance as the standard operating mode of government-aligned tabloids. The case was reported by HVG, Media1, and Index.

TV2 Demokratikus Koalicio incorrect Tier A correction issued
“Tények: Juhász Péter politikus Portik Tamásnak dolgozik (series of 16 false claims)”

TV2 Tények broadcast that opposition politician Péter Juhász (then associated with DK-aligned opposition) was carrying out assignments for convicted criminal Portik Tamás and receiving payment for this. The Budapest Metropolitan Court found all 16 specific factual claims false and ordered TV2 to read out corrections on air. TV2 refused to read the corrections in full, sabotaging legally binding final judgments; courts imposed the maximum fine of 500,000 HUF multiple times, a sum TV2 preferred to pay rather than comply. Juhász later compiled a 1 hour 45 minute video of TV2 correction announcements to use as evidence in a European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg) complaint against Hungary. This case was documented by atlatszo.hu, hvg.hu, and media1.hu.

Patterns in this database (read the caveat)

The tables below count cases in this database only. They do not represent German media as a whole. Download the dataset (JSON) · Download dataset (CSV)

Documented cases in this database, by outlet

These counts describe only the journalism cases catalogued here, each independently verified. They are not a representative sample of overall media coverage. Which cases exist here depends on what courts, the Press Council, and fact-checkers chose to assess. Information operation cases are excluded from this table.

Base: 37 journalism cases (of 41 total).

Outlet Cases (of 37) Claim benefits Claim harms Press-council sanctions
MTVA 9
Magyar Nemzet 7
Origo 6
TV2 3
Pesti Srácok 3
Ripost 2

Documented cases in this database: outlet × party

What this shows: counts of independently adjudicated cases in this database.

What this does not show: how media covers parties overall. Cases enter this database only if a court, the Press Council, or a professional fact-checker examined them — so these counts reflect what has been investigated, not what exists. This is a curated catalogue, not a representative sample. A larger database does not remove this limitation.

Base: 36 false-claim journalism cases (of 37 journalism cases; 41 total). For evidence about actual coverage patterns, see What independent studies find →.

Outlet DK Fidesz Jobbik Lehet Mas a Politika - Magyarorszag Zold Partja Magyar Szocialista Part - Parbeszed Magyarorszagert Part Momentum Mozgalom TISZA
Figyelő
HírTV
Index
MTI
MTVA
Magyar Hírlap
Magyar Nemzet
Mandiner
Mediaworks county network
Origo
Pesti Srácok
Ripost

N↓ = harms (negative tone)  ·  N↑ = benefits (positive tone)  ·  Cells link to the filtered case list. Scope: false-claim journalism cases only.

Documented cases in this database, by party

These counts describe only journalism cases rated incorrect or misleading, each independently verified. They are not a representative sample of media coverage. Information operation cases are excluded from this table.

Base: 36 incorrect/misleading journalism cases (of 37 journalism cases; 41 total).

Party False-claim cases (of 36) Claim harms party Claim benefits party Net Targeted (approx.)
TISZA 20 0 0 0 20
DK 4 0 0 0 4
Jobbik 4 0 0 0 4
Lehet Mas a Politika - Magyarorszag Zold Partja 3 0 0 0 3
Magyar Szocialista Part - Parbeszed Magyarorszagert Part 3 0 0 0 3
Fidesz 1 0 0 0 1
Momentum Mozgalom 1 0 0 0 1

* "Targeted (approx.)" = cases where party is the subject of the false claim (party field = approximate subject). A party can be targeted by a claim that ultimately benefits it.

Press-council cases in this database, by year (last 10 years)

This table covers the complete published decision archive for this press council body, not a curated selection. It is near-complete for the body's own published output — unlike the journalism and information-operation case tables above, which are curated.

Source: Lakmusz — full published decision archive.

Year Total decisions Reprimands (Rüge) Dismissed (unfounded)
2026 82
2025 22
2024 6
2022 2

Information Operations

These cases document coordinated, deceptive-by-design content: fake news sites mimicking established outlets, AI-generated deepfakes, fabricated quotes attributed to politicians, and government-funded inauthentic networks. The evidence standard differs from the journalism section: attribution of a state or organisational actor comes exclusively from the named assessor (foreign-office report, independent research organisations). Counts here are never combined with the journalism section.

Documented existence and attribution of a campaign does not establish its effect on any election outcome.

Storm-1516 network TISZA Tier B
Attributed actor (per assessor): Russia (Storm-1516 network) (Lakmusz fact-checks (30.03.2026 and 19.05.2026); EDMO/Gnida Project Russia-Hungary report (2026))

A campaign launched on 2026-03-28 via a fake 'investigative' website (24veritas.com) presented a forged email to claim that TISZA vice-president Ágnes Forsthoffer was involved in Jeffrey Epstein's sex trafficking network. Lakmusz fact-checked on 2026-03-30, finding that the email was clearly spliced: the word 'Hungarian' had been inserted before 'Ágnes' where the original Epstein document stated 'New York'. The Gnida Project attributed the operation to Storm-1516, a Russian disinformation group previously identified in US and German election interference. The story was too implausible for mainstream pro-government Hungarian media to pick up. However, Mi Hazánk Mozgalom politician Árgyelán János shared a follow-up version on 2026-05-13 falsely claiming Forsthoffer had 'participated in trafficking 41 Eastern European girls to the US'; Lakmusz reported this amplification on 2026-05-19. No retraction was issued by Árgyelán.

Fidelitas TISZA Tier B
Attributed actor (per assessor): Fidelitas (Fidesz youth organisation) (Lakmusz fact-check (15.10.2025))

Fidelitas (Fidesz youth organisation) launched an anti-conscription petition citing a video of TISZA defence spokesman Romulusz Ruszin-Szendi as proof he favoured mandatory military service. Lakmusz established that the video had been manipulatively cut: the full sentence was 'Today, Hungary's situation is not such that, in optimal circumstances, mandatory military service should be reintroduced' — the first half was removed, making it appear Ruszin-Szendi supported conscription. The manipulated clip was subsequently embedded in AI-generated war-themed videos promoted as paid Facebook ads, and a version appeared in a government Christmas magazine sent to pensioners — amplified via the Megafon influencer network spending an estimated €1.3 million on hostile-narrative ads during the 2024–2025 cycle.

Megafon TISZA Tier B
Attributed actor (per assessor): Megafon (government-funded influencer network) (Lakmusz fact-check (15.04.2025))

In April 2025 the Megafon government-funded influencer network published a manipulatively edited clip depicting TISZA leader Péter Magyar aggressively snatching a microphone from opera singer Rost Andrea at a Tisza Párt rally in Szolnok on 2025-03-24. Multiple Megafon content creators presented the isolated moment as evidence of Magyar's aggression toward women. Lakmusz fact-checked the claim on 2025-04-15, obtaining the full unedited recording. The full footage showed that immediately after the awkward handoff both performers embraced and sang together cooperatively for approximately 20 seconds — a reconciliatory conclusion that every single Megafon video deliberately omitted. Lakmusz assessed the clip as manipulatively edited: a microphone-sharing communication moment was stripped of its resolution context to imply aggression toward a woman. No correction was issued by any Megafon creator.

Megafon TISZA Tier B
Attributed actor (per assessor): Megafon (government-funded influencer network) and Fidesz proxies (Lakmusz / Political Capital / Mérték, published via EDMO (August 2024))

A joint investigation by Lakmusz, Political Capital, and Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely — published via EDMO in August 2024 — documented that 98% of spending on 'hostile narratives' in the 2024 EU election campaign came from Fidesz and its proxies. Megafon (a government-funded influencer network) spent €1.3 million on false or misleading narratives, including claims that Péter Magyar (TISZA founder) was a 'Soros-financed' agent, that 'European pro-war politicians and their Hungarian servants want to start World War III', and that Manfred Weber (EPP) planned mandatory military service across all EU member states — a claim Lakmusz fact-checked as false (Weber had spoken only about Germany). Fidesz and proxies spent €5.4 million total on Facebook/Google ads vs €839,000 for all 14 opposition parties combined. Fact-checkers identified false or misleading claims in 511 paid ads worth €475,000.

Cases by attributed actor

Only cases where the assessor named a specific actor are shown. Cases without an identified actor are excluded from this table.

Base: 4 information operation cases (of 41 total). Actor attribution from named assessor only.

Actor (per assessor) Cases
Fidelitas (Fidesz youth organisation) 1
Megafon (government-funded influencer network) and Fidesz proxies 1
Megafon (government-funded influencer network) 1
Russia (Storm-1516 network) 1

What independent studies say

This section lists only findings from independently conducted studies with stated methods and sample sizes. None of these findings are derived from the case counts above.

Bias research measures specific things — tone, actor visibility, topic selection — over specific outlets, samples, and time windows. Findings do not automatically transfer to other periods, other outlets, or an outlet's overall output. Each study's own stated limitations are shown below.

These studies measure different things using different methods, samples, and time windows. They must not be averaged or combined into a single verdict. Each finding is valid only within its own stated scope.

M1 (MTVA public television)

Hírek, narratívák, médiumok 2023–2024 (News, Narratives, Media 2023–2024): Comparative Content Analysis of Two Time Periods and Eight News Sources Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely (Mérték Media Analysis Workshop) (2024) Not peer-reviewed Tier C — attributed content analysis
Method:
Comparative content analysis examining narrative prevalence and actor attribution across two four-week monitoring periods (one politically quiet period, one election campaign period)
Sample:
Eight major domestic Hungarian news sources; two four-week periods in 2023 and 2024; focus on politically intensive news sections
Funder:
European Commission / HDMO project
On Origo (pro-government outlet), an outstandingly large number of narratives appeared; the government was the most frequent narrator (1,219 times), while the opposition barely appeared (20 times). During the election campaign period, content about domestic parties/politicians rose from 15% to 38% across all outlets. The balance at 24.hu is illustrated by an almost equal count of opposition (139) and governing party (137) narrative appearances. The study treats pro-government messaging present in mainstream media as 'narratives' disseminated in public discourse and maps their concentration by outlet.
Stated limitations:
The study covers eight selected outlets over two defined periods; findings cannot be generalised to all Hungarian media. The monitoring framework defines 'narrative' in a particular analytical sense; readers should consult the full methodology. Only two time windows were examined.
A Media System Abandoned: The Hungarian Media Under Siege and Without Support (Soft Censorship 2023) Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely, in collaboration with Political Capital, AFP, Lakmusz, Idea Foundation, Epresspack (2025) Not peer-reviewed Tier C — attributed media critique
Method:
Economic and legal analysis of media market structure, resource allocation, regulatory environment, and platform relationships; supplemented by disinformation-tracking (AFP, Lakmusz) and expert interviews
Sample:
Entire Hungarian media market, 2023; including MTVA state-media group, major print/digital titles, advertising market data, and regulatory decisions
The analysis identifies 'soft censorship' — defined as 'media policy interventions that significantly increase the chances of some viewpoints reaching the audience' — as the dominant mechanism shaping the Hungarian media landscape. Pro-government outlets receive substantial public advertising resources while independent media face systematic economic destabilisation. The research group and its collaborators found that Fidesz did not gain spectacular new positions in 2023 but the situation of independent media also did not stabilise. European platform regulation has not substantially improved independent outlets' competitive position.
Stated limitations:
Data for Hungary remains 'often incomplete' in several market segments. European legal complaints previously filed (including from Mérték itself) have been exhausted without resolution, limiting remaining accountability mechanisms. The report is an annual monitoring product, not a randomised or experimental study.

Megafon

A Media System Abandoned: The Hungarian Media Under Siege and Without Support (Soft Censorship 2023) Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely, in collaboration with Political Capital, AFP, Lakmusz, Idea Foundation, Epresspack (2025) Not peer-reviewed Tier C — attributed media critique
Method:
Economic and legal analysis of media market structure, resource allocation, regulatory environment, and platform relationships; supplemented by disinformation-tracking (AFP, Lakmusz) and expert interviews
Sample:
Entire Hungarian media market, 2023; including MTVA state-media group, major print/digital titles, advertising market data, and regulatory decisions
The analysis identifies 'soft censorship' — defined as 'media policy interventions that significantly increase the chances of some viewpoints reaching the audience' — as the dominant mechanism shaping the Hungarian media landscape. Pro-government outlets receive substantial public advertising resources while independent media face systematic economic destabilisation. The research group and its collaborators found that Fidesz did not gain spectacular new positions in 2023 but the situation of independent media also did not stabilise. European platform regulation has not substantially improved independent outlets' competitive position.
Stated limitations:
Data for Hungary remains 'often incomplete' in several market segments. European legal complaints previously filed (including from Mérték itself) have been exhausted without resolution, limiting remaining accountability mechanisms. The report is an annual monitoring product, not a randomised or experimental study.

Origo

Hírek, narratívák, médiumok 2023–2024 (News, Narratives, Media 2023–2024): Comparative Content Analysis of Two Time Periods and Eight News Sources Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely (Mérték Media Analysis Workshop) (2024) Not peer-reviewed Tier C — attributed content analysis
Method:
Comparative content analysis examining narrative prevalence and actor attribution across two four-week monitoring periods (one politically quiet period, one election campaign period)
Sample:
Eight major domestic Hungarian news sources; two four-week periods in 2023 and 2024; focus on politically intensive news sections
Funder:
European Commission / HDMO project
On Origo (pro-government outlet), an outstandingly large number of narratives appeared; the government was the most frequent narrator (1,219 times), while the opposition barely appeared (20 times). During the election campaign period, content about domestic parties/politicians rose from 15% to 38% across all outlets. The balance at 24.hu is illustrated by an almost equal count of opposition (139) and governing party (137) narrative appearances. The study treats pro-government messaging present in mainstream media as 'narratives' disseminated in public discourse and maps their concentration by outlet.
Stated limitations:
The study covers eight selected outlets over two defined periods; findings cannot be generalised to all Hungarian media. The monitoring framework defines 'narrative' in a particular analytical sense; readers should consult the full methodology. Only two time windows were examined.
A Media System Abandoned: The Hungarian Media Under Siege and Without Support (Soft Censorship 2023) Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely, in collaboration with Political Capital, AFP, Lakmusz, Idea Foundation, Epresspack (2025) Not peer-reviewed Tier C — attributed media critique
Method:
Economic and legal analysis of media market structure, resource allocation, regulatory environment, and platform relationships; supplemented by disinformation-tracking (AFP, Lakmusz) and expert interviews
Sample:
Entire Hungarian media market, 2023; including MTVA state-media group, major print/digital titles, advertising market data, and regulatory decisions
The analysis identifies 'soft censorship' — defined as 'media policy interventions that significantly increase the chances of some viewpoints reaching the audience' — as the dominant mechanism shaping the Hungarian media landscape. Pro-government outlets receive substantial public advertising resources while independent media face systematic economic destabilisation. The research group and its collaborators found that Fidesz did not gain spectacular new positions in 2023 but the situation of independent media also did not stabilise. European platform regulation has not substantially improved independent outlets' competitive position.
Stated limitations:
Data for Hungary remains 'often incomplete' in several market segments. European legal complaints previously filed (including from Mérték itself) have been exhausted without resolution, limiting remaining accountability mechanisms. The report is an annual monitoring product, not a randomised or experimental study.

The outlets in the database above without a qualifying study are not given any rating or characterisation here. "No qualifying study on file" is not a positive or negative finding.

Documented False-Claim Cases: Outlet × Party Matrix

Each cell shows the number of documented false-claim cases (rated incorrect or misleading) or party-tagged press council rulings involving a given outlet and party. Circle size is proportional to case count. Color indicates the majority direction of impact across cases: red = majority damage the party, green = majority benefit the party, gray = mixed or press-council cases with no directional tone data.

Majority: harms party Majority: benefits party Mixed / no tone data fewer → more cases

IMPORTANT: This chart covers only documented cases in this database — it is NOT a representative sample of overall media coverage volume, and cannot be used to claim systematic bias. Which cases exist here depends on what courts, the press council, and fact-checkers chose to investigate. See the methodology page for full caveats.

Treatment chart data (text equivalent)
Outlet Party Cases Majority tone
MTVA Demokratikus Koalicio 1 gray
MTVA Fidesz 1 gray
MTVA Momentum Mozgalom 1 gray
MTVA TISZA 5 gray
Magyar Nemzet Jobbik 2 gray
Magyar Nemzet Lehet Mas a Politika - Magyarorszag Zold Partja 1 gray
Magyar Nemzet TISZA 4 gray
Origo Demokratikus Koalicio 1 gray
Origo Jobbik 2 gray
Origo Magyar Szocialista Part - Parbeszed Magyarorszagert Part 1 gray
Origo TISZA 2 gray
Pesti Srácok Demokratikus Koalicio 1 gray
Pesti Srácok Magyar Szocialista Part - Parbeszed Magyarorszagert Part 1 gray
Pesti Srácok TISZA 1 gray
TV2 Demokratikus Koalicio 1 gray
TV2 TISZA 2 gray
Ripost Lehet Mas a Politika - Magyarorszag Zold Partja 1 gray
Ripost TISZA 1 gray
Index TISZA 1 gray
Figyelő Magyar Szocialista Part - Parbeszed Magyarorszagert Part 1 gray
Magyar Hírlap Lehet Mas a Politika - Magyarorszag Zold Partja 1 gray
HírTV TISZA 1 gray
Mediaworks county network TISZA 1 gray
MTI TISZA 1 gray